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3 African agency in global trade governance 
Donna Lee 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the key multilateral arenas for 
African agency.
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 Throughout the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations of 
the last decade or so, African countries have been politically active and, as a result, 
prominent players in the multilateral discussions around proposed new trade rules for 
the twenty-first century global economy. In this chapter, I highlight the contours of 
African agency in the WTO and the role that African delegations have played as key 
protagonists in the DDA talks. I take agency to mean the ability to change the 
processes of global trade governance and the rules governing world trade. Using a 
constructivist approach, I concentrate on the role of discourse, as well as the various 
capacity enhancing strategies employed by African members states, so that they are 
better able to influence the DDA negotiations. I argue that the relationship between 
the political action of Africans and their strategic context (the DDA) is mutually 
constitutive.
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 Consequently, the strategic action of African negotiators is formulated 
by, and also impacts on, the negotiating and decision-making processes within the 
WTO. In the case study which follows, the relational interaction of African agency 
and the DDA negotiations produces deadlock, while also constituting Africans as 
influential in the WTO. 
 By 2012, after more than a decade of on-and-off talks between the WTO 
member states, the DDA negotiations were deadlocked. Analysis of the deadlock 
tends to focus on the spoiling impact of the so-called ‘rising powers’ Brazil, India and 
China (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Narlikar 2010; Stephen 2012). This chapter, 
however, adds to the mounting body of work focusing on the spoiling influence of 
least-developed countries and highlights their role as increasingly significant 
participants in the WTO negotiating processes (Jensen and Gibbon 2007; Lee 2009; 
Lee and Smith 2008; Mshomba 2009). In particular, this chapter explores how African 
states, concerned at the increasingly unequal distribution of the benefits of market 
opening, can shape the processes and outcomes of global trade governance and, in so 
doing, compose themselves as influential. My analysis of African agency highlights 
their imitative use of discourse in global trade governance as a means of influencing 
the negotiations in general and defying dominant players, such as the United States of 
America (USA), in the WTO, in particular. 
 Constructivist approaches remind us of the crucial role discourses can play in 
international relations, although they tend to suppose that prevailing discourses serve 
dominant state purposes only.
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 Wilkinson (2009), for example, discusses the role of 
discourse in the WTO as a tool of the dominant powers and non-state elites within the 
global trade system, in order to illustrate the social processes at work in securing top-
down asymmetrical agreements in global trade. In this chapter, however, I invert the 
predominant method used by others, exploring the role of discourse in the study of 
international relations. Rather than seeing dominant discourses as the exclusive 
weapons of the strong, I highlight their potential as ‘weapons of the weak’.4 My 
purpose is to explore how subordinate African actors have made normative use of the 
discourse of the dominant states (in this case, a discourse of development) in the WTO 
as a means of challenging and resisting the power of the USA and other major states. 
In this case study, weak African actors (in a structural sense) use the development 
discourse embedded in the DDA to hold powerful states accountable for their trade 
behaviour. 
 I develop this approach to the role of discourse in global governance from 
earlier work by Sharman (2007) on peripheral states in the system of tax havens. In 
this fascinating study of the conflict between microstates, such as the Bahamas and 
Liechtenstein, and powerful players, such as the European Union (EU) over attempts 
by the latter to impose new regulatory measures in tax and banking, Sharman 
demonstrates how these small tax havens accented the powerful states’ own neoliberal 
discourse of the value of market competition in the conflict in what he calls a 
‘mimetic challenge’ (2007: 48). The tax haven states were able to expose the 
contradiction between attempts by the EU and others to introduce new regulatory 
measures in banking and taxation, while at the same time fronting free market 
discourses in multilateral forums such as the WTO, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Using a ‘mimetic challenge’, tiny tax havens – 
some of which were aid dependent on the very countries that they were resisting – 
were able to defy powerful states by re-communicating their own well-established 
neoliberal principles, in order to challenge the very idea of market regulation. 
 Deploying this ‘mimetic challenge’ approach – where states imitate the 
discourse of others – in this chapter, I highlight the ways in which African states are 
able to make use of the prevailing discourse of development in the DDA – a discourse 
initiated and advanced by the major states when launching the Round – to resist a 
multilateral trade agreement that falls short of their expectations of what is promised 
in the development discourse. Thus, imitating the dominant discourse of development 
becomes a source of subordinate state resistance in the DDA and a key factor 
explaining the delay and deadlock in the negotiations. Consequently, while states such 
as Kenya, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Egypt lack market power in the international 
system, they make up for this material subordination by using discursive power in 
their attempts to defy dominant states in the WTO. Here, then, is the essence of the 
strategic relationship between African political action and the discursive context of the 
DDA. African agency is formulated by and, at the same time, impacts on the 
prevailing development discourse and the negotiating context in which it is 
communicated. 
 The DDA was launched in November 2001 to explicitly address the needs of 
developing countries, and, throughout the negotiations, African states have insisted 
that major powers deliver on this public commitment to development. When 
development issues have been sidelined in, for example, the non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA) negotiations or by European and Japanese attempts early on in the 
negotiations to place the so-called ‘Singapore issues’5 onto the agenda, African states, 
along with other developing and least-developed countries, vetoed agreement.
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 I 
provide new qualitative evidence to support the argument that the resistance was 
triggered and aided by their strategic relationship to discursive factors. This evidence 
includes WTO documentation, as well as private qualitative data from a series of 
interviews with African missions in Geneva and Brussels and with non-state actors 
based in Geneva who work with and support African WTO member states. These 
include the South Centre and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD), as well as officials from the WTO, the African Union and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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 My purpose is 
to demonstrate dynamic African agency in the WTO and suggest that it is a significant 
– though certainly not sole – factor in the continuing delay and frequent deadlock in 
the Doha Round. I limit my analysis to an explanation of why Africans have become 
participants in the WTO system and the impact they have had on the negotiating 
processes in the last decade. It is too premature to examine the relationship between 
African political action and shifts in trade policy and rule changes until we know the 
details of the endgame. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. I begin by discussing the DDA deadlock, 
especially in relation to the role of African agency. I then highlight evidence of 
growing African agency in the DDA, focusing on the factors which explain the 
emergence and development of an enhanced willingness and capacity of some African 
states to engage with, and impact upon, current global trade governance processes in 
the WTO. Having highlighted African agency as a key element of the current DDA 
talks and reason why the talks are in stalemate, I then briefly discuss how this leads to 
what Sharman (2007: 52) calls ‘institutional Darwinism’ in global governance. That 
is, competition between various forms of trade governance – bilateralism, regionalism 
and multilateralism – with the prospect that only the fittest (read: most effective) will 
survive. My concluding remarks draw attention to the mutually constitutive 
relationship between African agency and the strategic context of the DDA. 
Deadlock in the DDA 
It is not possible, in what is a brief chapter, to provide a detailed account of the course 
of the negotiations and a blow-by-blow narrative on the occasions when the talks have 
stalled. Instead, I simply highlight that most high-level meetings of the Doha talks 
have ended without consensus on the most contentious issues, and, as a result, a DDA 
agreement is far from completion. We should not underestimate the task in-hand for 
WTO members to agree on new trade rules. The membership is large (over 150), and 
the trade and trade-related issues under discussion are broad and contentious; 
members have been trying to reach a multilateral agreement to create a market 
opening for agricultural and manufacturing goods, trade in services (GATS), and 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 
Doha Round has mostly been in deadlock over the last decade and that it has been 
marred by a series of failed WTO Ministerial meetings, some very spectacular, such 
as the so-called ‘Collapse of Cancun’ in 2003.8 And while some high-level meetings 
produced some progress, for example, the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, 
they were quickly followed by an impasse in the negotiating committees in Geneva, as 
delegates sought to unpack the details of the Hong Kong Declaration on ending 
agricultural subsidies by 2013.
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 The negotiations following the Hong Kong meeting 
proved hugely difficult, and it was not long before further deadlock in the talks, 
mainly over agricultural subsidies, marred the July 2006 Geneva Ministerial meeting. 
Immediately after this failed Ministerial, the WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, 
suspended the talks. 
 A further high-level meeting in Potsdam in June 2007 also ended in deadlock, 
with the issue of developed country agricultural subsidies again proving the main 
sticking point. Although Doha meetings resumed again in Geneva in July 2008 (as a 
result of discussions among elite nations at the 2007 meeting of the World Economic 
Forum), these talks lasted only nine days and eventually collapsed, due to a failure to 
achieve agreement on the perennial issue of developed country agricultural subsidies, 
as well as conflict over special safeguard measures.
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 A subsequent Ministerial 
meeting in Geneva in December 2009 once again failed, as least-developed countries 
continued to insist on meaningful development content to a DDA agreement.
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 In more recent meetings, the USA has continued to demand more market 
access to developing countries, while developing countries have responded that the 
USA should offer more in special safeguards in agricultural trade to protect their poor 
farmers. The North–South stand-off in the DDA continues (The Hindu 2011). The 
Doha Ministerial Declaration makes explicit mention of the need to give special 
consideration to the needs of developing countries (WTO 2001). Yet, as Scott and 
Wilkinson argue, the ‘development content of the Round has been whittled away over 
the course of the negotiations’ (2010: 12) Given the resistance of developing and 
least-developed countries to an agreement without significant development content – 
the ‘mimetic challenge’ – there seems little prospect of an endgame to the Round as it 
enters its second decade of negotiations.
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 Certainly, the view often expressed by officials working in, and around, the 
WTO in Geneva, when asked about the likelihood of the completion of Doha, is a 
pessimistic one. Many of the Mission staff and WTO officials interviewed in the 
summer of 2010 spoke repeatedly of their frustration with the negotiating process and 
the social impact of the continued failure of the DDA talks. Some described Geneva 
as something of a ghost town and lamented ‘there is nothing going on here’. Mission 
officials talked of trade delegates returning to capital to ‘renew their careers’ and ‘find 
more significant trade policy work’. WTO officials talked about the need to move on 
to work in other organisations, ‘where there was more happening’.13 Not that the 
WTO as an institution can do much about the current deadlock. As a member-driven 
institution with a relatively small secretariat, it lacks the political and administrative 
means to compel the member states to complete the Round. Instead, it is reduced to 
repeated appeals by the Director General for re-engagement and renewed political will 
from member states.
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 When asked about the causes of the impasse, African officials, not surprisingly, 
repeatedly talked of the need for major states to ‘deliver on their development 
promises’ in the DDA negotiations.15 This sense of expectation of – even entitlement 
to – development is also evident in many formal submissions to the WTO by African 
states and the Africa Group. In 2006, for example, following the release of the Draft 
Ministerial Text (more commonly referred to as the ‘Derbez Text’) at the Cancun 
Ministerial meeting in September 2003,
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 the Kenyan delegation to the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Development submitted a detailed critique of the proposals 
outlined in the Text on behalf of the Africa Group. It concluded that:  
the proposed decisions will not confer any economic benefits on developing countries, 
much less facilitate their integration into the multilateral trading system. They are 
framed in language which would not oblige developed countries to take positive 
measures to increase market access opportunities for developing countries. (WTO 
2006a) 
 Some of the interviewed African officials working in Geneva repeatedly stated 
their reluctance to complete the Round without significant development commitments. 
One official said:  
we are not unreasonable negotiators. All we have been insisting on in the committees 
is that others keep to the development agenda we all agreed to when we launched the 
new Round in 2001. Even when commitments on issues related to our development 
are agreed during the negotiations, they get forgotten later on.
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Formal communiqués submitted to the WTO by the Africa Group during the 
negotiations support these views. For example, in 2006, the Africa Group issued a 
communiqué to a special session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture quoting 
paragraph 55 of the Hong Ministerial Declaration, which makes an explicit 
commitment that members address the particular trade-related concerns of developing 
and least-developed countries related to commodities in the course of the agriculture 
and NAMA negotiations (WTO 2006b). A common theme of the interviews was that 
African officials believed that developing countries had a ‘legitimate right’ to expect a 
Doha agreement to deliver development; ‘why call it a development round 
otherwise?’ one official asked.18 Clearly, African hopes were raised by the language 
and norms of development written into the Doha Declaration. They imitated this 
language of development in the negotiations. 
Africa in global trade governance 
We have learnt to ask why, we have learnt to ask how, and we have learnt 
to say “No”. 
(Interview with an African delegate to the WTO in Geneva, June 2010) 
Traditionally, African states, when considered, are seen as a problem to be addressed 
by global economic governance, that is, they are perceived as objects in global 
governance. In this objectification, they receive global economic governance and 
global economic policies and processes, rather than shaping them. In sum, they have 
no agency; there is no African strategic action. This is particularly the case with small 
African states whose less-developed economies leave them with scant market power, 
and it is assumed, therefore, that they are unable to impact a decision-making 
environment like the WTO, where large market power is seen to determine outcomes 
in negotiations. Prevailing conceptualisations of global governance see African and 
other least-developed countries as marginal actors in global economic governance 
regimes, such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, the Group of Twenty 
Finance Ministers and the World Economic Forum (for example, see Grynberg 2006). 
Indeed, the experience of most African countries as they engage with these institutions 
is one of economic dependence and political marginalisation. In the case of the WTO, 
however, African engagement is now direct and central to the current Doha Round of 
negotiations (Lee 2009; Jensen and Gibbon 2007). 
 Before the establishment of the WTO, African countries enjoyed very little, if 
any, influence in multilateral trade governance. Although most African countries were 
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
19
 histories of the 
eight multilateral trade rounds conducted during the GATT period (1948–1995) 
indicate that African members states were largely absent from these negotiations. 
Recent analysis of developing countries in the GATT highlights the active 
involvement of India, Cuba, Chile, South Africa and Brazil, but they find little 
evidence of least-developed African strategic political action (Wilkinson and Scott 
2008). In contrast to their passivity in the GATT, African countries have become 
active in the WTO. There is much evidence of this: the large number of proposals 
submitted by African states and the Africa Group (Senona 2005), the appointment of 
African delegates as Chairs of negotiating committees, the regular meetings of the 
Africa Group in Geneva and the leadership of other coalition groups by African states 
(such as Mauritius’ position as coordinator of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) Group and Zambia as coordinator of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
Group). 
 How is it that African states have become more active in the WTO during the 
Doha Round negotiations? There are at least three reasons that explain this dynamic 
agency. First is the opportunity created by the discursive turn which prioritises – at 
least rhetorically – development and fairness discourses in the context of market 
opening objectives, which provide a weapon of resistance. Second is the opportunity 
created by the consensus-based decision-making process in the WTO, which provides 
a mechanism for resistance by enabling African states to say ‘no’ and thus block 
agreement. Third is the various ways in which the deliberative capacity of African 
states has been enhanced during the DDA, so that they are better able to ‘ask why’ and 
‘ask how’ during the DDA process. This is most striking in the more developed states, 
such as Kenya and Egypt, but it also includes several least-developed states, such as 
Burkina Faso and Rwanda, although many less-developed states still have inadequate 
capacities to engage in WTO processes in any meaningful way. 
Development discourses and opportunities for dynamic African agency 
While least-developed countries may lack market power due to the small size and 
scale of their economies, they have opportunities to exercise discursive power and 
defy leading states, such as the USA, as a result of a decisive discursive turn in global 
economic governance at the beginning of the new century. This discursive turn placed 
development firmly at the top of the agenda of various global governance regimes. A 
series of events, beginning with the November 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in 
Seattle and including the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000 
which adopted a set of ‘Development Goals’, provided a very powerful development 
steer for the WTO that found its way into the Doha Ministerial Declaration in 
November 2001. Cumulatively, they created what Jensen and Gibbon call a 
‘heightened role of moral argument’ (2007: 5). These developments heralded a 
collective global responsibility for development to reduce poverty in the least-
developed states of the world (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005). Developing countries, 
including African states, have been able to challenge the major powers in the WTO to 
deliver on development throughout the DDA negotiations on the basis of this 
collective steer on development. The dominant discourse of development opened up 
opportunities for African states to say ‘no’ to any agreement that did not include 
meaningful development outcomes. 
 This was seen particularly in the cotton negotiations, which quickly became an 
acid test of the commitment of Washington, in particular, to furnish development to 
some of the poorest farming communities in West and Central Africa by reducing 
domestic subsidies to American farmers. Given the symbolism of the cotton issue in 
the DDA, the Africa Group has stated more than once that there will be no completion 
of the DDA without an agreement on cotton (Lee 2007). Having signalled that the 
current Doha Round would place the needs of the developing countries at the centre of 
the work programme, the legitimacy of the WTO system of global governance, as well 
as the reputation of the powerful states that dominate the regime, now rests on a 
meaningful development outcome. Previously, the legitimacy of the global 
governance of trade rested on its remarkable success at reducing tariffs and generating 
growth in global trade (Lee 1997). Few contest the effectiveness of global trade 
governance in achieving this, but trade liberalisation as an end in itself is no longer 
sufficient (Lee and Smith 2010). Since the emergence of the discourse of development 
and its prevalence over the market opening discourse, the success of the WTO now 
rests on its ability to govern trade in a more equitable and fair way to create 
development for the poorest countries in the international system and thus reduce 
poverty among the poor communities in the world. The pervasiveness of a 
development discourse, with its normative appeals to fairness, has been a key factor in 
facilitating the activism of least-developed African countries during the DDA. 
 Sharman (2007) notes how weak states can create strategies of resistance by 
imitating the language and rhetoric of the dominant states. The WTO development 
discourse provides opportunities for least-developed states to defy the powerful states 
by using the language and vocabulary of fairness that they have directly introduced 
into the WTO. For example, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in 1995 
placed the development needs of the least-developed states at the forefront of the new 
organisation. The development language in the Agreement was often quoted in the 
formal submissions by African states to the various negotiating committees in the two 
months just before the suspension of the DDA negotiations in July 2006.
20
 As 
discussed above, African officials use the language of development when talking 
about their expectations and experiences of the DDA. 
Consensus decision-making and African activism 
It is customary in the WTO to make decisions by consensus, even though, in theory, a 
voting system is in place. This means that, in practice, weaker states can, if they are 
willing, veto multilateral agreement. Each formal WTO negotiating body reaches 
agreement by unanimity and, as such, ‘no-one’s objections can be ignored’ (Tijmes-
Lhl 2009: 420). Even though the practice of so-called ‘Green Room’ meetings 
continues and is evidence of the importance of market power in the WTO,
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 this is 
seen as ‘irrelevant if an elite negotiated and drafted the text as long as every member 
can express his consent or dissent regarding the draft’ (Tijmes-Lhl 2009: 421). Non-
objection, however, is not the same as setting the agenda, and, while Africans have 
become more active in the WTO and successful in resisting the top-down imposition 
of an agreement, they have also been frustrated in their attempts to get agreement on 
substantive policy changes in many areas, especially in the agriculture committee and 
sub-committees (Lee 2009; Lee and Smith 2010). 
 It is important that, because of the existence of the consensus rule, African 
states can veto Green Room decisions. However, the continuing significance of the 
Green Room process means that specific policy interests of those not included cannot 
be placed on the DDA agenda without other forms of intervention. Furthermore, any 
African absence in the formal negotiating committees (as opposed to the informal 
Green Room process that cannot claim legitimate decision-making powers) counts as 
non-objection to decisions. This is because of the way that the consensus rule is 
applied: member states have to be present at the negotiating committee meeting, 
council meeting or Ministerial meeting to veto decisions. To take full advantage of the 
opportunities generated by the discursive turn of institutional processes, such as 
consensus decision-making, and to develop engagement strategies beyond saying ‘no’, 
African states have had to enhance their deliberative capacities during the Doha 
Round. Only by ensuring that they can attend formal meetings and that those present 
have some technical expertise and knowledge of trade issues can such influence be 
developed. This operational challenge has been met by some, though by no means all, 
African states, and the development of the Africa Group coalition has been a major 
factor in the process of sharing limited resources to ensure an African presence in the 
WTO meeting rooms. 
Negotiating capacity building efforts and African activism 
African members’ more effective involvement in the Doha Round negotiations has 
been augmented as a result of a combination of capacity building factors, including 
increased advisory and technical support from the WTO and other international and 
regional organisations, such as UNCTAD, the African Union and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), non-governmental organisations, such 
as the ICTSD, Oxfam, the Advisory Centre in WTO Law (ACWL) and South 
Centre.
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 Although some of the African Mission officials interviewed in Geneva in 
March and June of 2010 seemed wary of WTO support, the take-up of WTO training 
programmes for African delegates is high, especially among the least-developed 
countries. The Development Division of the WTO spends 30 per cent of its budget on 
training courses for African member states and also provides interns to African 
missions to enhance their capacity in Geneva, as well as a full-time staff African 
Group coordinator, who organises meetings and retreats for African states.
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 African states have been quite shrewd in exploiting the support offered by other 
trade-related international and non-governmental organisations based in Geneva. 
There are an extensive range of supportive organisations that share and champion the 
development goals of least-developed countries, such as the South Centre and ICTSD, 
creating an extensive social and political network in Geneva to enhance the 
deliberative capacity of some of the most resource-starved missions. It is important to 
recognise the way in which African states use this non-elite network to empower 
themselves in DDA negotiations. African officials in Geneva spoke of the practice of 
seeking technical information and intelligence from these organisations as a starting 
point. They also mentioned that they often seek advice on writing WTO submissions 
and proposals. One official claimed, for example, that UNCTAD had assisted African 
states in drafting Africa Group proposals on agriculture and NAMA and that Oxfam 
had assisted African states in drafting Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) proposals.
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 Non-governmental organisations (NGO) staff who work with 
African missions in Geneva claimed that the 2003 Cotton Initiative submitted by the 
so-called Cotton Four (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) was authored by a 
leading member of staff from a partner NGO also based in Geneva. It is an open secret 
in Geneva that the ACWL writes African and other developing country proposals – 
largely because it has spare capacity, due to the limited engagement of developing 
countries in the dispute settlement mechanism.
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 Not only have African states used these organisations to enhance their capacity, 
they have also made normative use of them in their discursive practices in 
negotiations. Oxfam, for example, is used by African states, according to some 
African delegates, in order to develop what they called the Crying Game strategy in 
the cotton negotiations. Oxfam’s detailed research into the relationship between USA 
cotton subsidies and poverty in African cotton farming communities (Oxfam 2002) 
was a key document that informed the Cotton Initiative and helped the Cotton Four 
gain normative traction in the ensuing cotton negotiations. Oxfam was also 
instrumental in influencing the publication of editorials in major US newspapers 
supporting African positions in the cotton negotiations (Lee and Smith 2010). 
 African states have also helped themselves by developing means of collective 
coordination and the sharing of resources to enhance their capacity to engage in the 
DDA, most notably through the development of a so-called ‘focal point’ system in 
both the Africa Group and the Least-Developed Countries Group in the WTO.
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 This 
involves a large number and wide range of African states, including Kenya, Nigeria, 
Morocco, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Zambia and Rwanda, who each take a lead in 
each of the negotiating committees and ensure that Africa has a presence and 
influence across the DDA negotiations. This system is seen as a particularly effective 
way of making the best use of limited capacity within the Africa Group and the Less-
Developed Group, where most less-developed states have very small missions in 
Geneva.
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 The ‘focal point’ system is, however, more than a simple resource-sharing 
process. It is also, according to several participants I interviewed, an important social 
system, where officials meet with each other and share experiences of the negotiating 
process. It is an ‘African space’ in Geneva, where they can celebrate the successful 
interventions that some may have had in committees or discuss their failures with each 
other. The ‘focal point’ system provides shared African opportunities for 
understanding the negotiating process and sharing ideas about how they might better 
influence that process. 
 Another development in capacity building, one that is Mission-based rather 
than collectively based, has been the tendency among most African states since 2006 
to increase the number of officials working in their missions in Geneva. Using the 
2006 and 2009 WTO staff directories as a guide, we can see that states such as 
Burkina Faso and Kenya have more than doubled the size of their missions.
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 That 
said, enhanced capacity in Geneva is often achieved by shifting staff from capitals or 
Brussels to work at the WTO.
29
 It was interesting to experience first-hand the very 
stark contrast in the relatively high staffing levels of the some African missions in 
Geneva, compared to the low staffing levels found in the same country missions in 
Brussels. Clearly some least-developed African countries have been forced to 
prioritise engagement in the multilateral negotiations in the DDA over bilateral or 
regional trade negotiations with the EU. Despite most African missions enjoying 
enhanced resources staffing, levels are still at a minimum in a number of least-
developed countries, such as Zambia. Continuing capacity issues seem to be a 
particular problem for francophone countries, according to some WTO officials, and 
these states struggle to engage effectively in the DDA, according to a number of 
delegates and officials interviewed on this subject in Geneva. 
 Finally, a further way that African states have enhanced their capacity to 
effectively engage in the Doha Round talks has been through coordination with other 
developing country coalitions, such as the G20, the G33, the NAMA 11, the ACP and 
the Like-Minded Group, using the development discourse as a way of building 
collective action among members. Coordination with these groups has enabled the 
Africa Group to focus its more limited resources on issues not covered by these 
groups (such as cotton) or piggyback on the proposals submitted by these groups, such 
as NAMA. According to some commentators and delegates, coordination with other 
groups has generally proved quite easy. This is because the very size of the Africa 
Group – as one of the largest coalitions in the WTO – makes it an attractive strategic 
partner in negotiations. 
 The added value of all this capacity building activity is that previously invisible 
African states have become more important to the process and form of current WTO 
negotiations and, thus, to global trade governance as a whole. This has been well-
documented in recent research into, for example, the cotton and TRIPs negotiations 
(Lee 2009; Mshomba 2009). Africans have learnt to say ‘no’ and enhanced their 
capacity to effectively engage in the DDA negotiations. In July 2008 – when the 
prospects for completion of the DDA came as close as they had ever been – the 
African-led cotton topic was one of only two issues (the other being the special 
safeguard mechanism) from a list of 20 so-called ‘critical issues’ not resolved at the 
Ministerial meeting (Scott and Wilkinson 2011). The Africa Group have repeatedly 
stated that without an agreement on cotton, there will be no final DDA deal, though, 
as others have pointed out, the negotiations could also have floundered on a number of 
key issues for less-developed countries, including the special safeguard mechanism, 
market access for less-developed countries, geographic indicators, tropical products 
and bananas (Ismail 2009; Scott and Wilkinson 2011). 
 A focus on the role that African states have played in the continued deadlock in 
the DDA negotiations tells us many things about global trade governance; not least 
that African activism can no longer be ignored. The problem, however, is no longer 
one of ensuring that African voices are heard in the WTO, but whether anyone is there 
to listen. Recent trends in the signing of bilateral and regional preferential trade 
agreements by large developed states, such as Australia and the USA, suggest that the 
WTO can, and is, being ignored (also, see Hurt in this volume, in relation to the EU). 
The deadlock in the DDA has led members to seek alternative forums for securing 
market opening in least-developed states, suggesting that the WTO is less relevant to 
major trading nations. 
African activism and institutional Darwinism 
The Doha Round is already the longest running trade round in the history of 
multilateral trade governance. The delay in completing the DDA seems to have 
increased the appetite of some member states to pursue bilateral and regional 
alternatives to trade governance. For the USA, Australia and the EU, in particular, the 
WTO is not the ‘only game in town’. What Sharman (2007: 52) refers to as 
‘institutional Darwinism’ now seems to characterise trade governance in the 
international system. That is, the WTO is competing with regional trade agreements 
and bilateral trade agreements in international trade rule-making. Major developed-
country governments – who account for the majority of the value of world trade – 
have been actively pursuing bilateral and regional free trade and investment 
agreements, in order to open up existing and new markets for some time (Capling and 
Low 2010; Crawford and Fiorentino 2005; Flint 2009). In an environment where 
suitable and more effective (from developed states’ perspectives anyway) alternatives 
to multilateral trade agreements exist and are more quickly achieved, the political 
commitment of developed countries to the Doha Round is, not surprisingly, somewhat 
diluted. 
 Although African states are also increasingly involved in bilateral and regional 
trade agreements with major markets, particularly Europe and, increasingly, China 
(Crawford and Fiorentino 2005; Tull 2006), these are less likely to produce the level 
of development possible in multilateral trade agreements. As noted by Hurt later in 
this volume, this is because the negotiations usually involve classic structural 
conditions of weak states trying to negotiate with the strong (conditions that, I have 
argued, are mitigated by the existence of a prevailing development discourse in the 
WTO). Outcomes rarely include the kinds of concessions that African countries are 
demanding in the current Doha Round. In fact, the concessions are often termed 
‘WTO Plus’, since they go beyond the WTO’s market opening agenda (Flint 2009). In 
the case of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the EU 
and ACP countries, the Europeans have been accused of adopting an aggressive stance 
to the talks with ACP (see Hurt’s chapter in this volume). 
 The problem for African states is that their increased activism – along with that 
of other developing countries – has raised the level of North–South contestation over 
the trade rules and processes governing global trade policy and failed to generate 
sufficient agreement in areas of trade policy to complete the DDA. The continued 
deadlock in the DDA has frustrated everyone, including major trading states, such as 
the USA, EU and China, who now seem less inclined to be as active in pursuing 
multilateral solutions to market opening, as they are bilateral and regional solutions. 
The surge in developing country engagement with global trade governance in the last 
decade has, it could be argued, created a counter-surge in bilateral and regional efforts 
at trade governance, and, as a result, the WTO appears to be less significant to 
contemporary international trade governance, at least for the major powers. 
Conclusion 
The WTO is a key multilateral arena for African agency and one in which it has been 
able to foster and sustain influence on global trade governance for more than a decade. 
During the DDA negotiations, African agency has been effective in bringing to the 
fore development issues in a normative frame, so that issues such as cotton subsidies 
become an intrinsic part of framing the DDA in development terms, rather than 
merely market opening, which was the prevailing discourse throughout the GATT 
regime period. 
 In this chapter, I have argued that African agency in the WTO negotiating 
process is built upon, and sustained by, opportunities that arise out of the existence of 
a prevailing discourse of development, as well as Africa’s effective capacity building 
efforts. My argument was developed using Sharman’s concept of ‘mimetic challenge’, 
in order to explain how prevailing discourses of dominant actors are used by weak 
actors to create leverage and influence outcomes. In this case study, what makes a 
discourse of the strong amenable to manipulation by the weak is the extent to which 
African states, acting collectively, have the capacity to imitate the discourses and, in 
so doing, hold the developed states to account for the commitments they have made to 
development, not only in the WTO, but also in the Millennium Development Goals 
process in the United Nations, the World Bank and the G8. Being able to act out the 
prevailing development discourse of the strong in the DDA enabled the weak to resist 
attempts by the USA, the EU and other developed states to water down or subvert 
their own stated development commitments. 
 The decision-making process of the DDA negotiations – the consensus 
decision-making process – created institutional opportunities for dynamic African 
agency. In order to take full advantage of these normative and operational 
opportunities, African nations had to enhance their collective deliberative capacity in 
the DDA talks. This was achieved by building strategic coalitions with each other and 
with other developing countries as a collective developing country presence in the 
DDA. Influence opportunities were also realised through the development of a 
coordinated African ‘focal point’ mechanism for negotiating committee membership, 
which ensured an African presence across the DDA decision-making process. Active 
engagement was also accomplished through enhanced capacity from significant new 
resource investment in many African missions. Finally, selective collaboration with 
supportive organisations, such as UNCTAD and Oxfam, added knowledge capacity to 
African agency in the DDA. 
 This chapter has demonstrated the relational interaction between the context of 
the DDA and African agency. African political actions were formulated in the context 
of the normative content of the DDA and in the context of its negotiating and 
decision-making processes. That African agency is strategic implies a dynamic 
relationship between African delegates and the context and content of the DDA in 
which they work. The opportunity for, and actuality of, African agency is influenced 
by the structural context and processes of the DDA and the prevailing discourses in 
the international system. At the same time, the DDA is influenced by African political 
action. The consequences of Africans asking ‘why’ and ‘how’ and saying ‘no’ has 
been considerable, perhaps even critical, because it has added to the mechanics of 
deadlock in the negotiations, and, this, in turn, has encouraged the leading states, such 
as the USA, the EU and Australia, to seek alternative bilateral and pluri-lateral 
negotiating forums for opening up markets. African and other developing country 
political action during the Doha negotiations has made the deadlock the standard, 
rather than the exceptional, circumstance in the WTO during the last ten years. At the 
same time, the deadlock has constituted African agency as significant to global trade 
governance. 
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